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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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Abstract 
The U.S. Navy transitioned to computer-based training (CBT) in A and C schools in 2003 
after a 2001 Revolution in Training report claimed that the Navy would realize savings in cost 
and training time without negatively affecting the quality of sailors arriving to the fleet. 
Anecdotal evidence from ship personnel suggested otherwise. This study analyzes 
maintenance data for the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system to determine whether the transition to 
CBT contributed to increased fleet maintenance costs.  
Government studies showed that the conversion to CBT was not the sole contributing factor 
to increased fleet maintenance costs or degraded fleet material readiness. Changes to the 
Navy’s training, maintenance, and manning programs during the early 2000s were all 
contributing factors. If the conversion to CBT were to have an effect anywhere in the Navy 
maintenance system, it should be seen in maintenance activities where sailors were 
performing maintenance on ships. Our analysis revealed that the average cost of these 
activities was significantly greater after CBT was implemented. This would support the 
anecdotal evidence that CBT was impacting the quality of maintenance on ships. 
Introduction 
Traditionally, the majority of specialized skills training (known as “A” and “C” schools) 
in the Navy has taken place in a classroom setting with instructors. At the turn of the 
century, Navy leadership became concerned that current training programs would not 
adequately meet future demands. As a result, the chief of naval operations (CNO) chartered 
an Executive Review of Navy Training (ERNT) to review the Navy training system and 
recommend solutions to improve training effectiveness and meet future training demands. 
The ERNT group noted that formal schoolhouse training requires a large investment 
in facilities, instructors, and laboratories and that future training demand would outstrip the 
number of billets available under the legacy schoolhouse system (Executive Review of Navy 
Training [ERNT], 2001). They suggested that the use of new training technologies could 
help meet that demand while reducing the cost of training. Motivated by these findings, the 
Navy established Task Force EXCEL (Excellence through Commitment to Education and 
Learning) to develop a continuum of lifelong learning, use a streamlined funding process 
and a single training authority, create a Human Performance Systems Model (HPSM), and 
link training and acquisition (Naval Personnel Development Command, 2002). 
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Part of the Navy’s new strategy included the use of new training technologies such 
as distributed learning, computer-based training (CBT), collaborative learning, and 
computer-mediated learning. The Navy claimed that the introduction of CBT would reduce 
both training time and training costs without reducing the quality of training received (ERNT, 
2001). Accordingly, CBT was introduced full-time into the training pipeline in fiscal year (FY) 
2003. 
A 2009 Naval Inspector General (IG) Report, Computer Based Training, reported 
that the introduction of CBT did reduce training time. However, sailors arriving to the fleet 
under CBT did not usually meet the required Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Tools (KSATs) 
upon reporting on board. Because of this, ships had to take the time to train sailors up to 
acceptable standards (Naval Inspector General, 2009). This suggests that while initial 
training costs may have been reduced by CBT, the overall cost of operations and 
maintenance, including on-the-job training (OJT), may have increased. 
This study examines the impact of CBT on Navy training costs as well as operations 
and maintenance costs before and after the implementation of CBT. We first look at 
Department of the Navy (DoN) Budget Reports from FY2000 through FY2010 to determine 
the macro-level impact of CBT on Navy costs. At the macro level, there are many variables 
besides CBT that could contribute to changes in maintenance costs, including the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) and increased operations tempo (OPTEMPO). However, it is 
impractical to isolate the impact of CBT on Navy maintenance costs at the macro level. 
Instead, it is necessary to look at the impact of CBT on a particular system, program, or 
technology. This research effort focuses on a single system, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar, 
collecting data at a level of detail that allows for the control of the various variables that 
might impact maintenance costs.  
We start with a discussion of the Navy’s classroom training system, the Revolution in 
Training and CBT, followed by a look at the Navy maintenance process and changes in 
manning and maintenance policies during the 2000s. Next, we focus on a single Navy 
system, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system, and examine how the conversion to CBT might 
have affected maintenance costs in that system. 
Training 
Training in the Navy occurs throughout a sailor’s career. After completing recruit 
training, sailors are sent to specialized skill training in their designated job specialty, or 
rating. In-rate training begins in A school, where sailors learn the particular skills specific to 
their job. From there, a sailor can receive additional training in C school. Once a sailor is 
assigned to a ship, he or she receives training for collateral duties such as quarterdeck 
watches, anti-terrorism/force protection watches, weapons handling, and the at-sea fire 
party. Additionally, sailors can expect to receive general military training in topics ranging 
from electrical safety to suicide prevention.  
Traditional Schoolhouse Training 
Until the early 2000s, in-rate training in the Navy was conducted in a formal 
schoolhouse setting, where instructors delivering the training are subject matter experts 
(SMEs) on the material they are teaching (ERNT, 2001). Typically, SMEs come from the 
fleet and have experience working on the equipment they are teaching about. Training is 
delivered in the form of lectures, and instructors are able to supplement the lecture material 
with tips and anecdotes from their career experiences (Naval Inspector General, 2009). 
In addition to lectures, sailors can reinforce their understanding of the material 
through hands-on experience in a laboratory setting. In maintenance courses, students are 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= - 346 - 
=
able to work on the exact equipment they will see in the fleet, and instructors are able to 
simulate equipment casualties for technicians to troubleshoot. Instructors are able to tailor 
the delivery of material to a class based on the students’ levels of comprehension. For 
example, if a class has difficulty understanding a particular concept, the instructor can 
choose to spend more time in the lab to reinforce what is learned during the classroom 
portion. 
There are several benefits to instructor-led training (ILT). Since a single instructor 
teaches a large group of students, group learning techniques can be employed that would 
otherwise be unavailable in one-on-one or CBT instruction. The formation of small groups 
within a class fosters team-building and allows students to help and teach each other. 
Compared to the costs of software development, testing, and hardware purchase, ILT is in 
some ways more cost effective, depending on class size and length of use. Additionally, the 
controlled classroom environment offers fewer distractions than CBT or distance learning. 
Finally, ILT doesn’t take as long to develop as CBT. It takes approximately 34 hours to 
develop one hour of ILT (Chapman, 2007), while it takes approximately 220 hours to 
develop a standard e-learning course (Chapman, 2006). 
ILT also has its disadvantages. Since everyone has different learning capabilities, 
some students may be more advanced and become bored while waiting for slower learners 
to catch up. Conversely, slow learners may have difficulty keeping up. Depending on the 
size and duration of the course, ILT may be more expensive than CBT. 
Revolution in Training 
In October 2000, the Executive Review of Navy Training (ERNT) group was charged 
with providing insights on how to improve and align training organizations, leverage civilian 
training practices, and use new technologies to provide a continuum of training for sailors. 
The 24-member group was comprised of military and civilian personnel, members of 
academia, research institutions, and industry. In 2001, ERNT released their report, 
Revolution in Training: Executive Review of Navy Training Final Report. 
During their review, the ERNT group noted that the demands for training had 
increased. At the macro level, the training demands are driven by the Required Operational 
Capabilities and Projected Operating Environments (ROC/POE). ROC/POE is a tool that is 
used to determine specific warfighting missions for each ship. Training requirements are 
derived from these missions and are then used to determine specific training requirements 
for sailors.  
Changes in the ROC/POE lead to increased ship training requirements which are 
passed down to the sailor level. The ERNT group noted that the finite number of seats 
available in the Navy schoolhouses was not able to support the increased training demands. 
Because of this, there were gaps in the types of training that current and/or potential sailors 
needed and what could be delivered.  
In many cases, this resulted in billets which could not be filled because there were no 
sailors with the required training to fill them. During the 1990s, several other items 
contributed to the lack of trained sailors. First, the pool of experienced sailors had 
decreased due to drawdowns and retirements. Second, it was difficult to compete for trained 
personnel in a healthy U.S. economy, and many trained sailors were leaving for jobs in the 
civilian sector. 
The ERNT group suggested that technology and the science of learning offered 
several opportunities to improve the Navy training system by reducing training time through 
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CBT and offering distributed learning opportunities that could be executed at the workplace. 
This is discussed further at the end of the report. 
Computer-Based Training 
Computer-based training, or CBT, is defined as “individual or group self-paced 
instruction using a computer as the primary training medium, to include web-delivered Navy 
E-Learning (NEL)” (Naval Inspector General, 2009, p. ii). In Navy A schools, students go 
through learning modules on a personal computer at their own pace. When students are 
done processing the information presented on the screen, they click “next” to proceed to the 
next piece of information. There are usually small knowledge assessments throughout the 
module, followed by a final knowledge assessment at the end of the module (Naval 
Inspector General, 2009, p. 7).  
Because the learning is self-paced, instructors were replaced with “facilitators.” 
Facilitators are not necessarily SMEs in the subject matter being delivered in the CBT 
modules. The purpose of the facilitator is “to ensure classroom rules are followed, assist with 
computer-related issues, and monitor student progress. They do not provide reinforcement 
of learning objectives or enhance retention of course material.” The problem with replacing 
instructors with facilitators is that students cannot go to a facilitator with a question about 
subject material, removing the opportunity to teach when a student is confused (Naval 
Inspector General, 2009). 
There are several advantages to CBT. The learning is self-paced and if the course is 
offered as distance learning, the schedule to take the course is flexible. Students can 
complete the course at their own paces, which generally shortens training time. Since there 
are no instructors involved, the message doesn’t change from one person to the next 
(Dhanjal & Calis, 1999). In addition, the Navy was able to reduce training time using CBT, 
which resulted in cost savings in training manpower and infrastructure, as noted by the Navy 
IG (2009) and the GAO (2010). 
However, the use of CBT raised concerns in the fleet about the level of knowledge of 
sailors reporting to ships from A schools. The inspector general (IG) noted that sailors 
arriving to the fleet under CBT did not usually meet the required KSAT standards and were 
unfamiliar with the equipment they would be working on and the tools they would need to 
use. Because of this, ships had to take the time to train sailors up to acceptable standards. 
In fleet interviews, some commands reported that qualification time was nearly double what 
it was before the introduction of CBT (Naval Inspector General, 2009). The GAO reports in 
2010 and 2011 made similar observations and concluded that the change to CBT had a 
negative impact on readiness. 
The Navy IG and GAO reports found that while the Navy’s use of CBT resulted in 
cost and training time savings, the quality of sailor reporting to the fleet was not as well 
prepared as ILT-trained sailors of the past. The result is that poorly-trained sailors may have 
contributed to declining material readiness in the fleet. The next section of this study 
examines Navy maintenance practices and highlights the findings of the 2010 Fleet Review 
Panel on Surface Force Readiness report. 
Maintenance 
Navy maintenance occurs on three levels: organizational level (O-level), intermediate 
maintenance (IM) activities, and depot level. This section of the study discusses all three 
maintenance levels. Additionally, this section discusses changes made to the maintenance 
process in 2003 which were reported on in the 2010 Fleet Review Panel on Surface Force 
Readiness (known as the Balisle Report for its chairman, Vice Admiral [VADM, Retired] 
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Phillip Balisle), a report that discussed declining fleet readiness as a result of changes to 
training, maintenance, and manning policies in the early 2000s. 
Shipboard maintenance begins with the Planned Maintenance System (PMS). PMS 
is governed by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA; 2003) Instruction 4790.8B, Ship’s 
Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) Manual. The instruction outlines the 
requirements for PMS on shipboard systems and equipment. The purpose of PMS is to 
provide ships with the means to plan, schedule, and perform preventive maintenance 
onboard and to identify potential equipment problems before the equipment fails.  
If corrective maintenance is required, the maintenance is reported, scheduled, and 
performed through O-level shipboard maintenance. Ship maintenance actions are reported 
in Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC), under Unit 
Level Consumption and Manhours—Organizational Corrective Maintenance. 
Intermediate maintenance (IM) is “normally performed by Navy personnel onboard 
tenders, repair ships, Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs), aircraft carriers, 
and fleet support bases” (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2003, p. I-5). IM jobs are deferred 
corrective maintenance jobs that are beyond the capability of the ship’s force and are sent 
off-ship for completion. IM is tracked in Navy VAMOSC under Maintenance—Intermediate. 
Depot-level maintenance “requires major overhaul or a complete rebuilding of parts, 
assemblies, subassemblies, and end items, including the manufacturing of parts, 
modifications, testing, and reclamation” (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2003, p. I-5). Depot 
maintenance is reported in Navy VAMOSC under Maintenance and Modernization—Depot, 
Other Depot. 
In 2009, VADM (Ret.) Phillip Balisle was directed to conduct a Fleet Review Panel 
(FRP) of surface force material readiness. The report noted that 4,052 billets were removed 
from Navy ships from 2001–2009. While billets were removed from ships, requirements such 
as maintenance, damage control watches, training, and in-port duties were not reduced 
(Balisle, 2010). The shortcomings of CBT described in the previous section exacerbated the 
problems experienced with manning reductions since sailors were not arriving on board with 
the right KSATs. The result was undermanned ships with poorly trained sailors with not 
enough time or know-how to perform routine maintenance actions. 
In addition to reduced fleet manning, shore facilities also received manning cuts. This 
means that maintenance that was intended for intermediate maintenance activities was 
pushed back to ship personnel, which were undermanned and poorly trained. In addition to 
the shrinking shore workforce, the amount of time the ships were available was shortened 
from 15 weeks to nine weeks (Balisle, 2010). These actions resulted in equipment being out 
of commission for longer periods of time. 
Finally, the 2010 Balisle report noted that changes in PMS were made because ships 
couldn’t meet maintenance requirements due to reduced manning. Maintenance 
requirements were either eliminated or extended in periodicity. The intent was to shift 
maintenance requirements to shore facilities, but since manning was reduced ashore, many 
requirements went away completely. The elimination and extension of maintenance 
requirements can lead to more opportunities for equipment to become inoperable, resulting 
in degraded fleet readiness (Balisle, 2010). 
The Navy introduced several major changes to training, maintenance, and manning 
policies during the early part of the 2000–2010 decade. The Balisle report found that training 
was a factor, but certainly not the only factor, that led to degraded fleet readiness. Manning 
reductions would have led to cost savings in the military personnel budget, but the impact of 
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the reductions may have resulted in maintenance cost increases in future budgets due to 
deferred maintenance actions, thus confounding the effect of CBT. Similarly, changes in 
maintenance policies may have impacted maintenance costs in future years. At a macro 
level, the impact of CBT is impossible to tease out (see Gibson, 2012, for an examination of 
Navy training, operations, and maintenance budgets between 2000 and 2012). For this 
reason, we decided to examine one system in particular, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system, 
in hopes that we could separate the two factors. 
AN/SQQ-89(v) Sonar System 
To examine the effect of CBT on rising maintenance costs, this study will focus on 
the operating and support (O&S) costs of a single Navy system, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar 
system, and look at how the conversion to CBT affected maintenance costs in that system. 
An analysis by Gibson (2012) showed that manning levels for sonar technicians did not 
change significantly from FY2000–FY2010, effectively eliminating manning as a contributor 
for the AN/SQQ-89 O&S costs and focusing the study on training and maintenance. 
The AN/SQQ-89(v) surface ship Anti-Submarine (ASW) Warfare combat system 
(referred to as “the 89” in the rest of this paper) is an integrated network of sonar systems 
designed to search, detect, classify, and engage ASW threats. The system is currently 
installed on CG-47 class cruisers, DDG-51 class destroyers, and FFG-7 class frigates. The 
89 uses a variety of sensors that can transmit (active) and receive (passive) acoustic data in 
order to detect and classify threats. Data from the sensors can be correlated and targets can 
be localized using Target Motion Analysis (TMA) to generate a firing solution for weapons 
systems (Jane’s Information Group, 2010).  
The 89 system consists of 15 different variants. Variants differ based on the sensors 
chosen and the version of each sensor. In this report, only variants 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9 were 
studied. These variants were chosen because they were on board ships prior to the 
introduction of CBT into the sonar training pipeline (2003) and remained on board after CBT 
was introduced. This allows for analysis of ship-maintenance trends both prior to and after 
the introduction of CBT. A list of ships per variant is given in Table 1. 
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 List of Ships and AN/SQQ-89(v) System Variants Used in This Study 
 
All sonar technicians–surface (STGs) attend STG A school. At A school, students 
learn the basic principles of the STG rating including oceanography and principles of sound. 
Following A school, STGs are sent to different courses depending on whether they are 
operators or operator/maintainers. STGs who are strictly operators are sent to a sonar 
operator course, where they learn how to operate the specific 89 variant of the ship to which 
they will be sent. Maintainers are sent to C school, where they learn the technical skills 
required to maintain the equipment they will work on upon reporting to their ship (Navy 
Personnel Command, 2012).  
CBT was introduced full-time into the training pipeline in FY2003, after the 
recommendations of the ERNT report (Naval Inspector General, 2009). Data were not 
available to show how STG course lengths were affected by the conversion to CBT. The 
2009 Navy IG report examined the course lengths of 22 A and C schools for ILT and CBT 
and found that on average, CBT course lengths were 26% shorter than ILT course lengths 
(Naval Inspector General, 2009). This study focuses on FY1999 through FY2010 to capture 
data prior to and after the introduction of CBT. Initially, FY1995 through FY1998 were also 
considered, but there were not enough data available during this time frame for most data 
categories. The raw data provided were analyzed to reveal relationships between selected 
data sets. 
Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare System 5 (PEO IWS5) provided a list 
of ships equipped with the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system. The list included ship class, ship 
name, hull number, homeport, and 89 variant number. Only ships with AN/SQQ-89(v) 
variants on board both before and after implementation of CBT were considered. The initial 
list provided by PEO IWS5 included all ships of the CG-47, DD-963, DDG-51, and FFG-7 
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classes. To narrow the ship list to match the scope of our study, ships were removed from 
the data set if 
 the ship was decommissioned during the FY1995-FY2006 time frame, 
 the ship received a variant upgrade, 
 the ship was commissioned FY2000 or later, or 
 the ship was outfitted with a variant introduced after FY2003. 
Using these criteria, the ship list was reduced to 68 ships. VAMOSC provided O&S cost 
data, underway steaming days, and selected non-cost data for ships equipped with the 
AN/SQQ-89 sonar system covering FY1995 through FY2010. Cost figures were given in 
then-year and constant FY2011 dollars.  
In addition to the overall 89 system data, detailed ship data were available for the 
selected ships. Non-cost data included number of personnel trained, maintenance 
manhours, and number of maintenance actions. The data were used to calculate average 
time (in manhours) spent per maintenance action. These numbers were calculated to 
determine training and maintenance trends pre- and post-CBT (see Figure 1). For instance, 
if the average time spent per maintenance action increased, it could suggest a backlog of 
maintenance or a lack of technical competence in performing a maintenance action. Prior to 
CBT, manhours spent per maintenance action were trending upward; after the introduction 
of CBT, manhours per maintenance action remained relatively flat. This suggests that 
manhours per maintenance action may have reacted positively to the conversion to CBT; 
however, this assumes that the types of maintenance actions performed remained relatively 
constant. 
 
 Manhours Spent per Maintenance Action 
Single-factor regression analysis was performed to explore the relationship between 
total training cost and the O&S variables provided by Navy VAMOSC. Unit Level 
Consumption, IM, Equipment Rework, and Depot Maintenance were selected as variables 
to determine whether changes in training costs resulted in increased maintenance costs. 
The selected variables represent organizational-level, intermediate, and depot-level 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= - 352 - 
=
maintenance. Unit Level Consumption is a summation of Organizational Repair Parts, 
Replenishment Spares, and Logistics Center (LOGCEN) exchanges. Equipment Rework is a 
summation of contractor and government Program Office rework costs. IM is a summation of 
afloat and ashore IM labor costs and ashore IM materials costs. Depot Maintenance is a 
summation of private and public shipyard depot costs. Training (Total) is a summation of 
Program Office and NETPDTC training costs. The results are shown in Table 2. 
 Regression Analysis—O&S Components 
  R2 
Unit Level 
Consumption 0.033 





In this case, regression analysis shows that none of the factors selected have a 
strong relationship to total training cost, suggesting that if maintenance costs are related to 
training costs in the STG rating, there are other factors not identified in this study that are 
having an effect. It is interesting to look at the relationship of IM costs and training dollars in 
a scatter diagram (Figure 2). 
 
 Training vs. Intermediate Maintenance Scatter Plot 
Figure 2 suggests that there may be a weak relationship between training dollars and 
intermediate maintenance costs and that this warrants further investigation. Specifically, the 
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plot suggests that as training costs increase, intermediate maintenance costs decrease. 
This would support the hypothesis that when less money is spent on training (as a result of 
switching to CBT), the maintenance costs will increase. 
Graphical analysis of several data categories indicated noticeable changes after the 
introduction of CBT. For example, Labor Ashore—Intermediate Maintenance Manhours 
showed significant change (see Figure 3).  
 
 Labor Ashore—Intermediate Maintenance Manhours 
The figure shows the number of manhours spent on IM for selected ships from 
FY1995 through FY2010. Beginning in FY2004, the IM manhours increased significantly for 
the selected DDG-51 and CG-47 class ships. While this may be partially explained by 
changes to Navy maintenance policy described earlier, it corroborates the evidence 
suggested in Figure 2, namely that as CBT is introduced and training costs decrease, 
intermediate maintenance hours and cost increase. This trend was not as evident, however, 
for the FFG-7 class. This may be explained by funding of the ship class, since many of these 
ships belong to the Naval Reserve Force and it is likely that their funding levels did not 
change throughout the period studied. 
Paired t-tests were conducted to determine whether the means of paired 
observations (selected ships pre- and post-CBT) were different. The null hypothesis is that 
there is no significant difference in the means before and after the introduction of CBT. The 
alternate hypothesis is that there is a significant difference between the means due to CBT. 
A negative t-statistic indicates that the pre-CBT mean was smaller, while a positive t-statistic 
indicates that the post-CBT mean was smaller. Response variables used in this study were 
corrective organizational and IM actions, organizational parts cost, exchanges LOGCEN 
cost, manhours organizational labor, and labor ashore IM manhours (see Table 3). 
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Mean t statistic p-value 
Corrective org. & 
IM actions 786 
before CBT 335 61.43 
-6.61 0.0000 
after CBT 458 85.10 
Organizational 
parts cost 790 
before CBT 336 6914.4 
-4.07 0.0000 
after CBT 466 9539.6 
Exchanges 
LOGCEN cost 563 
before CBT 238 43752 
-6.30 0.0000 
after CBT 328 72178 
Manhours org. 
labor 779 
before CBT 335 739.9 
-7.03 0.0000 
after CBT 466 1208.7 
Labor ashore IM 
manhours 206 
before CBT 109 107.51 
-5.17 0.000 
after CBT 149 357.17 
In all cases, the p-values were less than 0.01, indicating a significant difference 
between the means pre- and post-CBT. This suggests that the introduction of CBT had a 
statistically significant impact on several measures of maintenance activity and cost.  
Interestingly, the number of maintenance actions (organizational and IM) increased, 
even though changes in Navy maintenance policies would have initially led to fewer 
maintenance actions. Since we report the average over several years, it is possible that the 
expected increase in future maintenance actions was part of the observed mean after CBT. 
It is also likely that changes in operating tempo (due to the GWOT) had a significant impact 
on this variable as well, so it is not possible to isolate the effect of CBT on corrective 
maintenance actions. 
Most interesting are the three categories related to maintenance actions performed 
by sailors at the ship level: organizational parts cost, exchanges LOGCEN cost, and 
manhours organizational labor. If the conversion to CBT were to have an effect anywhere in 
the Navy maintenance system, it would be at maintenance activities where sailors were 
performing maintenance on ships. This data would support the anecdotal evidence provided 
by ship operators that CBT training would also impact labor ashore IM manhours (in IM 
facilities); however, a confounding variable for IM is that several shore-based IM facilities 
were closed and shore-based IM billets for sailors were eliminated. 
Conclusion and Areas for Further Research 
In 2001, ERNT released its report, Revolution in Training: Executive Review of Navy 
Training Final Report, which led to a major overhaul in the U.S. Navy’s training practices, 
including the use of CBT in A and C schools. While government studies of the Navy’s CBT 
training confirmed that the transition to CBT resulted in shorter training times and cost 
savings, sailors reporting to the fleet were not as well prepared as classroom-trained sailors 
of the past, and extensive OJT, supervision, and assistance in performing basic 
maintenance tasks were required to bring CBT-trained sailors up to speed. 
During the same period of time that CBT was being implemented, the U.S. Navy 
reorganized its maintenance program and reduced total manning levels on ships, even 
though ship requirements did not change, meaning that ships had to do more work with 
fewer personnel. Many maintenance requirements were deferred or eliminated on ships with 
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the expectation that shore facilities would pick up the slack, but shore facilities also 
experienced manning reductions. As a result, less planned maintenance was being 
performed on equipment, which increased opportunities for equipment failure and 
decreased fleet material readiness. 
This study looked at costs from a systems perspective, considering not only the cost 
of training but also the cost of maintenance. We asked the following question: If sailors 
trained with CBT had lower knowledge and skill levels, did this contribute to increased 
operations and maintenance costs?  
Unfortunately, there were too many confounding variables that could have affected 
operation and maintenance costs during this period of time to draw any conclusions about 
the effect of CBT on maintenance costs from the Navy level. Instead, we focused on a 
single Navy system, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system, to examine the effects of the 
conversion to CBT on maintenance.  
The results of the study revealed several pieces of useful information. Regression 
analysis indicates a weak relationship between decreasing in training costs and an 
increasing in IM costs. In addition, paired t-tests showed that the conversion to CBT may 
have led to increases in corrective organizational and IM actions, organizational parts cost, 
exchanges LOGCEN cost, manhours organizational labor, and labor ashore IM manhours. 
Of particular interest were results for manhours organizational labor, organizational parts 
cost, and exchanges LOGCEN cost, all associated with maintenance performed by sailors 
at the unit (ship) level, because conversion to CBT training would be most noticeable at 
maintenance activities where sailors are performing the maintenance.  
As the Navy IG, GAO, and Balisle reports suggest, there are several factors that 
have contributed to declines in fleet readiness. Most notably, the simultaneous combination 
of changes in training, maintenance, and manning policies appear to have had lasting 
negative impacts, including rising fleet maintenance costs. The data analysis performed in 
this study shows that the change to CBT was statistically significant when compared to 
several maintenance variables, but it is also likely that changes to all three areas (training, 
maintenance, and manning) had collective negative effects which go much further than 
rising maintenance costs and actions. It is clear that policy changes in the 2000s impacted 
fleet readiness in a negative manner, but no clear conclusions can be drawn about the 
specific impact of CBT on total system cost from the data examined in this study. 
Because the data collected can be characterized as panel data, statistical analysis 
that recognizes the panel nature of the data will be performed and reported in another 
paper. It may be useful to study the impacts of the conversion to CBT on other Navy 
systems. From a training perspective, the lack of measures of effectiveness for training may 
prove frustrating in drawing any conclusions, but from a cost perspective, it may be possible 
to gain further insight into the types of cost most affected by CBT. 
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